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“No greater crime can be found than seeking to corrupt the moral law, and thus there is noth-
ing more harmful than a lax ethics, namely when the law accommodates itself to evil opinion.
The ethical law is a punctual and strict law that requires perfection in the highest degree.”
(Powalski, 27: 164.5–10)
It does not bode well for an ethical theory if it inflicts unrealistic requirements on moral
agents, if it strains human nature unduly, or if the price of complying with its prescriptions
seems not worth paying. Classical utilitarianism is particularly vulnerable to such objec-
tions.1 It is, however, a legitimate question whether other ethical systems fare any better. In
this paper, I address the issue whether Kant’s ethics can be impugned or rejected on the
grounds that it is overly demanding.
§1. Two ways of asking too much: pervasiveness and radical self-denial
An ethical theory can be said to ask too much of us in at least two distinct ways.2 There is,
first, the allegation that morality is too pervasive, i.e. that its commands do not leave room
for the non-moral pursuits that are part of a good life. This problem arises when we try to
understand ethics in terms of abstract and overriding moral rules. Bernard Williams, for in-
stance, argues that general and indeterminate obligations to advance worthy ends leave no
room for merely permissible actions. Such duties
will be waiting to provide work for idle hands, and the thought can gain a footing
[…] that I could be better employed than in doing something I am under no obliga-
tion to do, and, if I could be, then I ought to be: I am under an obligation not to waste
time in doing things I am under no obligation to do. (Williams, 2006: 181)
It is difficult to see how any action falling under a rule of this kind should fail to be obligat-
ory. In a world like ours, a general obligation to be helpful would keep us extremely busy,
leading to an extensive altruism that threatens to sideline all of our more self-regarding in-
terests.3 Moreover, as our concern for beneficence is likely to dominate our thoughts, virtue
1. The modern debate was sparked off by Singer, 1972. It is, however, worth noting that Singer is
not, strictly speaking, a ‘classical’ utilitarian but an advocate of what has been called “the Simple
Principle of Beneficence” (Murphy, 1993: 268) or of “consequentialism-plus-constraints” (Pummer,
2016: 79). 
2. These are separate issues. But both arise when the charge of overdemandingness is levelled
against maximising consequentialism, which is probably why they are not commonly distinguished.
3. What, for Williams, makes the situation even worse is that an obligation can only be limited by
is likely to take a heavy psychological toll. This makes a life devoted to duty seem impover-
ished and sad. 
Secondly, an ethical theory can be criticised on the grounds that it calls for too great a
sacrifice on particular occasions. We may have to give up all hope of future happiness or die
for an unconvincing cause. The underlying worry is once again that selfless behaviour
would undermine the non-moral values that are part of a well-rounded, flourishing human
life, that extreme self-denial is incompatible with human nature, or that we cannot comply
with a command of this kind since we lack a motive that is strong enough to bring the pre-
scribed action about. As ought arguably implies can, this line of argument can be used to
discredit an ethical theory that contains such an exacting command.
§2. Kant and the eighteenth-century debate
Such doubts naturally occur to anyone who reflects on the scope and authority of morality,
including Kant and his contemporaries. In the spirit of the above distinction, Alexander Got-
tlieb Baumgarten labels ethical theories ‘deceptive’ or ‘chimerical’ if (i) they posit moral reas-
ons on which the agent cannot act because he lacks a sufficient motive or if (ii) they include
spurious obligations that are not incumbent upon human agents at all.4 We know from
Herder’s practical philosophy notes that Kant avails himself of Baumgarten’s distinction as
early as 1763/64. Kant argues that the Stoics fail at the first hurdle because their ethics over-
taxes the human will; and he attacks Hutcheson for taking selflessness and benevolence too
far (27: 15.14–17). 
In the Critique of Practical Reason more than two decades later, Kant criticises the
fantasies of the novelists of his time,5 as well as the intellectualist “heroism” (5: 86.13) of
Stoicism, as expressions of “enthusiasm” (Schwärmerei, 5: 86.11). Both err in that they portray
moral perfection as attainable, the former through sentiment (cf. 5: 155.8), the latter through
another obligation, and as a result we we need to introduce “one of those fraudulent items”, a duty to
oneself, to be allowed to do what we want to do (Williams, 2006: 182). We are allowed to pursue our
own interests only at the expense of intellectual dishonesty, ceding additional ground to a morality
that now also extends to our dealings with ourselves. In what follows, I shall mainly focus on the
demands imposed by duties to others. The duty to cultivate one’s talents, for instance, may up to
point help to contain altruism by rebalancing the moral scales; but they are still prescriptive, i.e. they
do not just let us do what we would like to do. They are therefore unlikely to do much to dispel the
overall worry of overdemandingness.
4. See § 7. of his Ethica. On the concept of a chimerical ethics in Baumgarten and Meier see
Thorndike, 2008 and Dyck, 2012. The worry that his own ethical theory might be a ‘phantasm’
(Hirngespinst) or a ‘chimera’ pervades the second section of the Groundwork and is officially laid to rest
only in the third. It is also in evidence in the early lectures on ethics, and in the Canon of the first
Critique, see Timmermann forthcoming. 
5. In the lectures on anthropology, Kant frequently targets Samuel Richardson’s History of Sir Charles
Grandison, which is bound to upset women by creating unrealistic expectations of less-than-ideal men
(see e.g. Collins, 25: 48 and 98). 
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exaggerating powers of reason and an unjustified sense of detachment from sensuous nature
(cf. 5: 127 fn.). But as human beings are made of flesh and blood, effortless virtue must re-
main an ideal. Kant praises Christianity for striking the right balance, subjecting human be-
ings to a duty that flows from “the purity of the moral principle” while at the same time
paying due respect to “the limitations of finite beings” (5: 86.15–17). This is not the time to
assess these allegations in detail. Let us simply note that Kant himself criticises ethical ideals
for ignoring the limitations of human nature, i.e. for – in this particular way – being too de-
manding. If so, it would be odd if he did not bear this worry in mind in devising his own
moral theory. 
Furthermore, Kant was also familiar with the tendency of the rules of a moral theory
to encroach upon the non-moral. His attitude towards adiaphora depends on what is at issue.
He banishes indifferents from the inner sanctum of his practical philosophy by denying that
there are morally neutral states at the level of an agent’s underlying disposition or character
(Religion, 6: 22.19–28 and fn.). Only two forces can – if we so choose – determine our con-
duct, inclination and pure practical reason. There are therefore only two ways of giving one
of them priority over the other. Our fundamental attitude is either good or bad. In this con-
text, Kant also denies that actions can be morally indifferent, if in a slightly non-standard
sense: there can be no action that is purely mechanical, that does not stand under moral
laws, that is neither obligatory nor forbidden nor permitted (6: 23 fn.). In the late Metaphysics
of Morals, however, Kant tries to preserve room for adiaphora in the regular sense of what is
‘merely permitted’ (cf. 6: 223.5–9). He warns moralists against turning objects of dietary
preference – whether to eat meat or fish, or to drink beer or wine (6: 409.16–17) – into moral
problems, a tendency he disparages as ‘micrology’ (6: 409.18).6 Moralising the amoral can
lead to another, perhaps somewhat less demanding kind of fantastic virtue. Micrological
principles need not be too difficult to comply with. They thereby encourage human beings
to consider themselves morally better than in fact they are. But even if the ‘tyranny’
(6: 409.19) of micrological rules turns out to be comparatively benign, it is clear that Kant is
aware of the danger that rules and regulations can come to dominate our lives. He would
like to steer clear of that threat in his own ethical theory.
6. Defined elsewhere as pedantry, empty pondering, excessive attention to formalities, useless
subtlety (cf. Anthropology, 7: 221.30, Logic, 9: 46.31–33 and 49.11, also R 2061) and – in particular – a
tendency to be overly scrupulous in matters of conscience (6: 440.15, cf. Powalski 27: 199.34). Note
that we are not talking about the realm of imperfect duty, or the worry that people might try to be too
virtuous, but attempts to include in the sphere of virtue options and choices that ought not to be
included. Just as a circle can never be too round or a line too straight, a human being can never be too
virtuous (cf. Doctrine of Virtue, 6: 433 fn.). 
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§3. Duties of right and duties of virtue
Let us examine Kant’s theory of obligation to see how demanding his ethics really is. The
categorical imperative generates two types of duty, both of which can target either the agent
himself or others. Kant draws this distinction – or closely related distinctions7 – in various
ways at different points in his works and lectures, contrasting ‘perfect’ or ‘strict’ with ‘im-
perfect’ or ‘wide’ duties, ‘necessary’ or ‘essential’ duties with ‘contingent’ or ‘non-essential’
duties, ‘owed’ duties with ‘meritorious’ duties, or juridical duties of ‘right’ with ethical du-
ties of ‘virtue’, and so forth. In the Groundwork, we are told how maxims that fall foul of
either class violate the first and second reformulations of the categorical imperative, but
there is little detail. The full system of duties remains a topic for a future Metaphysics of
Morals (4: 421 fn.), a promise he struggles to make good in 1797. 
Fortunately, a fuller picture can be assembled from other writings, from his hand-
written notes and from what we know about his lectures on moral philosophy. The ‘laws’ as-
sociated with strict or perfect duty prescribe actions immediately and directly. They are rel-
evant throughout. They always result in token obligations, i.e. they always provide sufficient
reason to act. They can be discharged completely. There is no casuistry. There is no discre-
tion. They are absolute, precise and clear. Juridical duties are prime examples. Take the
Groundwork’s prohibition of fraudulent promises. If I urgently need a loan I may well be tem-
pted to make a promise I do not intend to keep. Yet I face an unconditional, non-negotiable
law not to do so. Just by itself, this law constitutes a prohibition of fraudulently promising,
regardless of my actual desires, projects or purposes. It does not even matter how morally
worthy they are because strict duties set the limits within which other duties produce valid
obligations.8 There are several such strict laws: not to murder, not to torture, not to lie etc.
They admit of being unrestricted because, as omissions, they cannot conflict with each oth-
er.9 We may well be tempted to dismiss such unrelenting standards, but there can be no
question that the philosopher Immanuel Kant was deeply committed to the idea. 
7. I shall ignore the problem of strict duties to oneself, which are neither enforceable duties of right
nor duties of virtue that leave latitude for the agent’s choice. Also, there are quasi-juridical duties in
the Doctrine of Virtue, namely duties of respect. The simplified distinction (strict–wide, juridical–
ethical etc.) will do for the purposes of this paper.
8. From now on, I shall observe Kant’s extraordinarily helpful distinction between ‘duty’ (Pflicht),
which is general, and ‘obligation’ (Verbindlichkeit), which denotes a particular, all-things-considered
occurrence of being bound to do something specific. Owing to my duty (type) to be helpful I have an
obligation (token) to call a doctor when I see that someone has been badly injured. 
9. Or so Kant thought. For a critical examination of this assumption see Hruschka, 1991. On moral
conflict in general see Timmermann, 2013.
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The ‘rules’10 of wide or imperfect duty obligate in a different and less straightforward
manner. They urge us to adopt morally good ends – our own perfection and the happiness
of others – and to realise them when the occasion arises and it is otherwise permissible to do
so. This kind of duty cannot be discharged completely; but we must do what we can. Strict
duties of omission provide the framework for virtuous practice. If we correctly subsume the
situation we find ourselves in under such a rule – if, for instance, there is someone who
genuinely needs and deserves our assistance – there is, in Kant’s terminology, an ‘obligating
reason’ or ‘ground of obligation’ (Grund der Verbindlichkeit, 6: 224.19), which turns into an ac-
tual obligation if and only if it is not defeated by other, weightier moral reasons or by sheer
physical impossibility.11 We may well suspect that sufficiently many such grounds survive to
make Kant’s ethical theory fairly demanding.12
§4. We must be beneficent whenever we can
Whether permissible action is really crowded out by obligation also depends on what ex-
actly the rules of wide duty say. Let us focus on beneficence. We might be able to dispel wor-
ries that being kind to others might overstretch our abilities or condemn us to a dreary life of
selflessness if moderation were built in to the maxim of beneficence that the categorical im-
perative urges us to adopt. 
The most prominent advocate of such a lenient principle of beneficence is Thomas
Hill.13 According to Hill, perfect duties tell us always to do x, imperfect duties sometimes to do
x. Crucially, Hill’s ‘sometimes’ does not reduce to the minimalist reading of latitude sugges-
ted below, i.e. it does not just refer to cases in which a ground of obligation is not defeated
by a weightier moral consideration or sheer physical impossibility. Hill’s principle of benefi-
cence is: “Sometimes, to some significant extent, promote permissible ends of others.” (Hill,
2002: 207).14 As a result, “we may sometimes pass over an opportunity to make others happy
10. I say ‘rules’ because Kant tends to reserve the honorific ‘law’ for the stricter type of duty. See § 5
below.
11. It is therefore misleading to say that strict duty overrides wide duty. A weightier ground of
obligation overrides another such ground to the effect that the latter does not turn into an obligation.
By contrast, strict duty limits what can count as obligation right from the start. It is in this spirit that
the 1803 Lectures on Pedagogy call for a ‘catechism of right’ to impress on children the priority of strict
laws. Someone who should pay his creditor today should not give the sum he owes to someone in
need because “I must be free if I want to perform charitable acts” (9: 490.12–13).
12. In sum, the latitude, room for play or – what comes to the same thing – the possibility of
exceptions that is a feature of imperfect duties can be equated with the fact that these duties do not
bind the will directly but leave room for rational deliberation, partly because they are restricted by
perfect duties and by weightier cases falling under the heading of imperfect duty, partly because, as
positive duties, they urge us to think about the appropriate choice of means, which is governed by
narrowly instrumental as well as long-term considerations.
13. For an extended discussion of Hill’s account see Timmermann, 2005.
14. Note that it is not entirely clear what the scope of the duty of assistance or beneficence is, i.e.
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simply because we would rather do something else” (Hill, 1971: 59). He recoils from endors-
ing a stronger principle precisely because he fears it would be implausibly demanding. 
But the duty of beneficence does not just tell us to promote permissible ends of oth-
ers ‘to some significant extent’. It tells us to adopt a straightforward maxim of beneficence,
which is curtailed by other ethical principles, e.g. the laws of strict duty and the requirement
not to risk one’s own independence. Having such a maxim is compatible with not acting on
it when it is impossible to do so, morally or otherwise; but expressions like ‘sometimes’ or
‘to some extent’ are not part of the maxim itself. In fact, they must not be included. Why this
is so can be gleaned from the way the duty of beneficence is established in the Groundwork
(6: 423). The initial reaction of a prosperous person who sees others struggle is not to help.
But as he reflects on what he is about to do he realises that he cannot will that a maxim of
non-beneficence be adopted universally.15 The maxim is therefore to be rejected. 
What principle does reason tell him to make his own instead of the one he was temp-
ted to adopt? Is the maxim that removes the negation from the maxim rejected. The agent
was tempted not to help. He then realises that helping others is a rational requirement.16
There is no reason to introduce any limitation at this stage.17 A principle sometimes to help
would be arbitrary and curiously half-hearted (see Seymour, 2008: 430); it would provide
little guidance; and it would actually serve as an excuse for the agent to rationalise his way
out of providing assistance to those in need. The simplicity of the principle of beneficence
should not come as a surprise. After all, in the first section of the Groundwork, Kant explicitly
says that it is our duty to be beneficent “where we can” (4: 398.8).18 
whether it is confined to helping those in dire need or whether – as Hill evidently assumes – it points
to a broader task of contributing to the happiness of others. See Moran, 2017: 316–321.
15. This is how Barbara Herman argues against Hill’s approach: “[T]he idea of an obligatory end that
gives us a ‘do something sometimes’ cannot be right.” Latitude is “not about frequency af acting for
the end, but a space for judgment as to how (and how much), in appropriate circumstances, the end
might be promoted” (Herman, 2007: 214–215).
16. Hill’s toned-down maxim to help would, if universally adopted, lead to a world in which it is
more likely that one misses out on receiving help, which is something the agent cannot want. A
maxim of making exceptions in the interest of inclination fails the categorical imperative test.   
17. The principle of beneficence does not determine what needs to be done a priori and by itself in the
way the law of truthfulness does, which (for Kant) requires no weighing of competing considerations
to be applied. But it is illegitimate to conclude that it leaves us any significant discretion once all the
relevant contingent data have been factored in. In that sense, the agent – and not the law – determines
what should be done, depending to circumstances.
18. I take this to be a sufficient and not just a necessary condition. Trivially, there is no obligation to
help if help is not required or if helping is impermissible. Note also that, in the Doctrine of Virtue,
Kant introduces a clear limit that our efforts to help others must not breach: our own poverty, which
would make us reliant on the help of others ourselves (6: 454.2–4, in a similar vein: 6: 451.6–19). Kant
is not advocating complete self-denial. 
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§5. Latitude, room for play, exceptions 
Kant repeatedly emphasises that, as a result of the complicated picture painted above, the
norms of imperfect or ethical duty do not determine what ought to be done with precision,
most notably perhaps in the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue: 
[W]hen the law can command only the maxim of actions, not the actions themselves,
that’s a sign that it leaves room for play19 (latitudo) for the free faculty of choice20 in
following (observing) it […]. (6: 390.4–7). 
The Vigilantius notes make essentially the same point. Unlike the laws of strict duty, 
laws of wide obligation determine only the type of obligation to the action, not its de-
gree, so that some room for play is left for its fulfilment, as the one who is obligated
retains the freedom to behave in this or that way; […]. (27: 536.28–31)
Can passages like these be squared with the fairly demanding account of imperfect duty
presented so far? Do they give virtuous agents permission occasionally to opt out of a duty
like beneficence when they feel like doing something else, or when the burden is just too
heavy? In particular, what exactly does Kant mean when he says that a law leaves the agent
‘latitude’? 
The first of the two sources provides the following explanation: An ethical law “can-
not determinately state in what way and to what extent the action ought to effect the end
that is at the same time one’s duty” (6: 390.7–9). In a similar vein, Kant demotes laws of wide
obligation in lectures given around the time the Groundwork was published: They are not,
strictly speaking, laws in the honorific sense because “they do not determine a priori21 what
and how much is to be done”. In particular, it cannot be determined “how much I could do
without and what part of my means I might therefore expend on acts of beneficence” (Moral
Mrongovius II, 29: 633.9–12). The decisive point is that the abstract rule or law derived from the
categorical imperative does not determine these details.22 That is not to say that they are
wholly undetermined or underdetermined once the agent has taken all relevant circum-
stances into account, let alone that helping others is optional, arbitrary or permits of discre-
tion. When I notice someone in need and it is not too difficult for me to help it is clear that I
19. Spielraum. The metaphor is mechanical. The OED’s first quotation illustrating this sense of the
English word ‘play’ is taken from Henry Mainwaring’s Sea-mans Dictionary of 1644: “In a storm it is
dangerous to let the Mast have any play.”
20. Willkür. Gregor says that it leaves “a playroom (latitudo) for free choice [sic] in following
(complying with) the law”, which makes imperfect duty look optional or arbitrary. 
21. There may still be a hint of the original sense of ‘a priori’ here: details are not determined in
advance. 
22. In contrast with juridical duties, where the law determines what needs to be done with
mathematical precision, see e.g. 6: 233.20. At least in part, our difficulties understanding Kant’s
limited conception of latitude derive from the fact that we do not share his belief in the exactitude of
juridical legislation. 
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need to do something – even if there are several justifiable options that I need to narrow
down or if another agent who is situated differently can be expected to do something else.
That is also the lesson to be learnt from our second primary source, the Vigilantius lectures
on the metaphysics of morals: 
E.g., the duty of beneficence determines only that I should use my means to support
the other, but how much remains reserved to the measure of my needs, my means
and the need of the other person. […] So too with the duty to advance one’s perfec-
tion […]. (27: 536.31–37)
So, what about the feature of ethical duties often mentioned in the same breath as latitude,
that – unlike juridical duties – they admit of exceptions (cf. VI 233.19–23, XXIX 618.3–4)? Kant
clarifies the matter23 in the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue:
But a wide duty is not to be understood as a permission to make exceptions to the
maxim of actions, but only as one to limit one obligatory maxim by another (e.g. gen-
eral love of one’s neighbour by the love of one’s parents), by which the field for the
practice of virtue is indeed widened. (6: 390.9–14)
The kind of case he has in mind is once again explicitly stated in the Vigilantius notes:
Here is the case where departures from the rule, or so-called exceptions, occur when
the law does not have true universality or absolute necessity (which is unlikely to be
found in any ethical law); e.g. beneficence lapses [bleibt weg] when one’s own poverty
or family needs have to be met. (27: 537.3–8)
In other words, exceptions occur when – because of another, weightier moral concern, or if
for whatever reason we lack the means to support both causes – we cannot respond to a de-
serving cause that would otherwise have led to an obligation. It is because of such cases that
the principle of love of one’s neighbour or beneficence towards strangers lacks universality,
not because agents are sometimes allowed to neglect their duties when philosophers think
they are overburdened. This is a far cry from Hill’s ‘sometimes’ clause. The limitations of im-
perfect duty are the result of moral decision making, not a premise that feeds into it. One of
Kant’s drafts for the Doctrine of Virtue provides an excellent summary: 
[A]ll obligation presupposes a law. If this law aims determinately and immediately at
the action so that the manner how? and the degree how much? is to be performed in
it is determined in the law, the obligation is perfect (obligatio perfecta) and the law ob-
ligates in the strict fashion: there remains for us no choice, neither for exceptions, as
to when the law is valid in its universality, nor for the degree of following it. But if
the law just does not command the action immediately, but merely the maxim of the
action, if it leaves the subject’s judgement free with regard to the kind and the meas-
ure to which degree what is commanded is to be performed, commanding only that as
much as under the given conditions is possible to do is necessary [emphasis J.T.], then the
obligation is imperfect and the law is not of narrow but only of wide obligation, late
obligans. (23: 394.1–13)
23. The clarification is needed because there is a footnote in the Groundwork that gives the misleading
impression that imperfect duties permit exceptions in favour of inclination (cf. 4: 421 fn.).
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The kind and measure, i.e. how and how much I do, is to be determined in the situation at
hand, not whether I respond to the call of duty. And this must be done in a reasonable and re-
sponsible manner. In sum, appealing to latitude does next to nothing to refute the allegation
that Kant’s imperfect duties will keep us extremely busy.
§6. First rejoinder: demanded by whom?
So far, Kant’s complex system of duties holds little comfort for those who worry that it
might be too demanding.24 The gaps left open by laws of perfect duty – which can them-
selves require self-sacrifice in unfavourable circumstances – are filled in by cases falling un-
der rules of imperfect duty in just the way Williams envisages. If, as we must, we go through
life with open eyes, duties like beneficence will reliably provide ‘work for idle hands’. So,
does Kant’s demanding moral philosophy fall prey to the overdemandingness objection?25
To see how the threat of overdemandingness can still be defused, consider the fact
that ethical theories do not themselves issue demands. What we mean when we say that
they do is that they contain a conception of obligation on which human decision making is
influenced by an appropriate normative authority. In Kant’s ethics, the obligating authority
is the agent’s own will, subject only to laws it imposes upon itself. In this it is crucially dif-
ferent from consequentialist theories. The value that ought to determine choice in, e.g., utilit-
arianism is external to a will that by nature is at odds with it: the greatest happiness of all. 
Now, it is at least in part the picture of an authority alien to our will and beyond our
control that makes us feel uncomfortable about demanding moral requirements. As Elĳah
Millgram notes in the closely-related context of the freewill debate:26
Words like ‘Necessity’ (or ‘determination’) make you think of coercion; that is, they
are associated with something on the order of images of yourself being dragged
around by a rope attached to your neck, or perhaps having your arm twisted behind
your back by the schoolyard bully. (Millgram, 2009: 196)
24. I have been embracing the position that Mary Gregor dubs ‘the rigorist view’ in her classic Laws of
Freedom (Gregor, 1963: 105). For a critical discussion of Gregor’s rejection of this form of rigorism see
Baron, 1995: 88–107. Much more needs to be said to argue, exegetically and philosophically, for some
specific version of rigorism in the sphere of imperfect duty. But for the purposes of this paper it will
be enough to assume that imperfect duties generate a host of rather demanding obligations. If we can
defend a radical view against the accusation of overdemandingness less radical views will a fortiori be
cleared of the charge as well.
25. Note that overdemandingness is a bigger worry for Kant than for the utilitarian because Kant is
much less of a revisionist. He prides himself on grounding his theory on common human reason. But
that means that he will struggle to dismiss overdemandingness ‘intuitions’ on the strength of his
theory (which is always an option for hard-nosed utilitarians). 
26. I should also like to thank Helen Small of Pembroke College, Oxford, for drawing this passage to
my attention. 
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But on Kant’s picture, we are not pushed around by the happiness of others. We decide to re-
spond appropriately, applying our own formal standards.27 Also, as the duty of beneficence
is an ethical duty, the people we decide to help do not have a right to our assistance; nor is
the obligation to help backed up by external force. Failing to help may, in one sense, be the
wrong thing to do; but in another it is not wrong because no one is wronged, and in that re-
gard it is permissible. We do not even owe someone in need an explanation if, for good reas-
ons or bad, we decide not to help (though it may be unkind not to offer one). But the fact
that an act cannot be demanded of me by others does not mean that I cannot demand it of
myself. So, if I do help, I do so voluntarily and of my own accord.
This does not, of course, mean that we always effortlessly comply with the com-
mands of reason that we realise flow from our own rational will. There will be motivational
obstacles. This is precisely why virtue is needed, which helps us view our inclinations with a
sense of detachment. Nor am I saying that virtuous action does not require personal sacri-
fice. But Kant seems to think that the restrictions imposed by moral laws are comparatively
benign. Reflecting on the autonomy of the human will can help us avoid at least some of the
negative aspects that very demanding conceptions of moral obligation are commonly per-
ceived to have. This is clear from the arguments against a ‘lax’ ethics we find in Vigilantius’
discussion of Schiller’s criticisms in On Grace and Dignity.28 There can be no doubt, we learn,
that the moral law constrains the will.29 But moral constraint, Vigilantius argues, is different
from “pathological” or “physical” constraint, which would generate “fear and at the same
time aversion” [Furcht und zugleich Widerwillen, 27: 623.36]. We also learn that moral con-
straint is an expression of freedom and spontaneity, “and this commands respect, not servile
submission” (27: 623.39). Vigilantius even calls the feeling of respect “voluntary” (27: 624.3);
and he concludes: “Harshness [Härte] is therefore inconceivable [garnicht denkbar]” because
of the awe-inspiring dignity of the law (27: 624.4). That is why, quoting Matthew, Kant says
in the second Critique that the “yoke” of duty is “easy” because it is imposed on us by reason
(5: 85.2–3). This may seem exceedingly optimistic; but it was clearly Kant’s view.
Moral progress goes hand in hand with the – gradual, and maybe initially pain-
ful – realisation that morality is an expression of our own rational will. That is why
autonomy is equated with freedom. Kant provides a remarkable description of a moral
agent in full control early on in the Doctrine of Virtue. In his example, the agent has his eyes
firmly set on a risky amusement. The risk does not deter him. But as soon as he realises “that
27. Kantian autonomy ist not a form of voluntarism. The legislator is the author of the obligation, not
the author of the law of obligation. Self-legislation is first and foremost legislation by the self in the
sense that the laws of impartial reason are normatively imposed upon (made authoritative for) the
human faculty of choice, a role previously occupied in Kant’s ethical theory by God. See
Timmermann, forthcoming.
28. See Kant’s official response in the contemporaneous Religion, 6: 23–24 fn. 
29. This is tantamount to an admission that the moral law can be demanding.
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he would thereby fail in one of the duties of his office or neglect a sick father”, he abandons
his intention not joyfully, yet without giving it much thought (unbedenklich), and thereby
“proves his freedom in the highest degree by being unable to resist the voice of duty” (6: 382
fn.). 
§7. Second rejoinder: virtue and merit
Utilitarianism is driven by an external conception of the good, but in practical terms it cen-
tres on the notion of right action. The overdemandingness objection is usually formulated in
terms of right and wrong: We ought to do what is right. If not, we do wrong and deserve
blame. But it is well-nigh impossible to get things right if the right is that which produces
the greatest happiness. That is why simple versions of utilitarianism seem so unfair. 
It should be obvious, however, that Kant’s theory is immune to this kind of objection.
The notions of right and wrong play no significant role in his ethical works. Like the Ground-
work, the Doctrine of Virtue is all about good action. Unsurprisingly, what is right – what, if
breached, deserves blame, censure or punishment – is the fundamental category of the Doc-
trine of Right. As Onora O’Neill notes, Kant “can effectively classify acts under two head-
ings”: “obligatory, merely permissible and forbidden” on the one hand and “morally
worthy, lacking moral worth or morally unworthy” on the other (O'Neill, 2013: 194). The cat-
egory of the supererogatory is missing. But virtue and vice, goodness and badness, merit
and demerit are scalar and therefore permit of degrees. As Kant himself says in one of his
handwritten reflections, “a good action could be better, but a right one not be righter”
(R 7036). His own conception of duty encompasses both dimensions.
This is an important point, not a terminological nicety, because it provides us with
the resources to say of two actions that one is better than the other without implying that the
latter is in any substantive sense wrong.30 As Kant says in the introduction to the Doctrine of
Virtue, fulfilling imperfect duties is meritorious, but their non-fulfilment is not a culpable of-
fence but rather mere lack of moral worth or goodness. He adds the important qualification
that failure to satisfy duties of virtue must not be the result of a wicked maxim not to yield
to such duties at all.31 Again, having a maxim of imperfect duty is compatible with not acting
on it out of weakness or a lack of virtue, which is not to be equated with wickedness.
Wickedness or vice is principled lack of responsiveness to the laws of virtue (see 6: 390.18–
29). Crucially, the meritorious is defined as that which “is done more in the way of duty than
30. We have already seen that a wilful omission to help can, in a sense, be the wrong thing, but that
this description is too thin to be helpful. Surely, it is the wrongness that – if done consciously and
willingly – signifies wickedness and a breach of rights that we should worry about.
31. A point emphasised by Baron, 1995 and explored in detail by Pinheiro Walla, 2015.
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someone can be forced to do by the law” (6: 227).32 Once again, it is important that virtuous
action is voluntary in a sense in which complying with strict right is not.33 
Terms like merit and demerit apply to individual actions. By contrast, the related cat-
egories of virtue and vice assess the morality of persons. Let A be a hardened criminal who
never comes to the aid of anyone. B is a truthful person who respects the lives and property
of others; she regularly helps her friends; each month she donates £100 to charity. C also ad-
heres to strict duty, but unlike B he is incredibly thoughtful and kind in daily life and
donates half his net salary to worthy causes. Let us assume that both B and C act from duty
when they do good. A does wrong. He is a bad person. B and C are not. They are not guilty
of any crime and do not deserve censure or blame. They are, as a matter of fact, fairly decent
human beings. Nevertheless, Kant would say that C is a better (more virtuous) person than
B, and common sense would agree. C has progressed further on the path to virtue because
he takes imperfect duty more seriously than B. As Kant puts it in the Doctrine of Virtue:
The wider the duty, the more imperfect therefore a human being’s obligation to do
the action, the closer he nevertheless brings the maxim of observing it (in his disposi-
tion) to narrow duty (of right) the more perfect is his virtuous action. (6: 390.14–17)
And that is what constitutes moral progress. All obligation is strict,34 but the way agents con-
sider and respond to obligation differs. A virtuous person will give priority to cases that less
virtuous people might consider less important, optional or even a nuisance.35 
32. Equity may be an exception, see 6: 234–235.
33. I acquire merit with regard to the beneficiary (who owes me gratitude), though not necessarily
per se, which is why it is still a matter of duty from the point of view of the good agent. See §§ 8 and
9. 
34. In one of his handwritten notes from the 1780s, Kant asserts that “all obligation is strict” and
explains this in terms of there being no exception from obligation. But that does not mean that all
laws or rules of obligation are strict; some are wide “because they do not determine the actions but
contain the motivating ground, albeit with limitations” (R 7270).
35. I should like to thank an anonymous referee for raising the question whether acting on imperfect
duty is laudable, and whether failure to act would be criticisable. It is difficult to say what Kant’s
response would be. I suspect that he would reject the use of these terms as unanalysed one-place
predicates. As with demands, we must first determine the appropriate authority. Whose task is it to
praise? Whose role is it to criticise? If what is at issue is not the violation of right but the more or less
of virtue, it would seem to be the job of the autonomous agent (or the rational part within him). If one
is uncertain whether one would do something oneself it is inappropriate to criticise others. What is
more, words like ‘laudable’ and ‘criticisable’ are incomplete in that, to be informative, they need to be
spelt out further. Does ‘laudable’ mean anything other than ‘is a good thing’? Does ‘criticisable’ mean
anything other than ‘is not such a good thing’? Trivially, even if it is not the task of others to tell me
so, I can say to myself that appropriately responding to an obligation of imperfect duty is good and
not responding is not so good – though not, by and large, wicked, malicious, evil, bad etc. There is no
such thing as ‘laudable’ and ‘criticisable’ simpliciter. 
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§8. Third rejoinder: demanded of whom?
Now that we have a clearer sense of the nature of Kant’s theory of obligation, let us turn to
the Kantian agent. We know him to be someone who, of his own accord, takes an interest in
acting on the laws of autonomous practical reason. Even so, the question remains whether
he might experience duties of virtue, particularly beneficence, as unduly demanding. Moral
laws often conflict with what we are inclined to do. Besides, Kant willingly concedes the
possibility of psychological conflict. The spectre of overdemandingness still haunts his moral
theory.
The idea of moral progress once again softens Kant’s perfectionism. Virtue need not
and cannot be achieved from one moment to the next. What agents can reasonable be expec-
ted to do depends on how much progress they have made already. Aristotle’s warning not to
confuse the ethical mean with the arithmetic mean can serve to illustrate this point. Ten
pounds of food is a large daily ration for anybody. Two pounds is very little. Aristotle argues
that we should not conclude from this that six pounds is the right ration for everyone. It is a
small ration for a champion wrestler like Milo of Croton, but too much for a novice (NE
1106b3 ff.). The same applies to how much exercise we – the couch potato, the amateur runn-
er, the Olympic athlete – should do. Or consider playing a musical instrument. A perfect
rendition of Bach’s partitas is an impossible task for the beginner. After years of patient prac-
tice, Hilary Hahn can play them in her sleep. Similarly, even on a suitably demanding con-
ception of ethics, the amount of virtuous activity we can expect depends on the develop-
mental stage of the agent in question. Virtue will appear daunting at first. Kant assumes,
controversially perhaps, that everyone can be expected not to violate perfect duty. But the
degree of beneficent activity will vary in that a novice on the path to virtue will do less than
an ethical Milo who is the ideal. Virtue goes hand in hand with reshaping sensibility under
the guidance of reason. It is hardly surprising that this will take – in fact: infinite – time.
Let us dwell for a moment on what happens to the Kantian agent as the internal ten-
sion between reason and sensibility eases on the path to perfection.36 There is, first, negative
moral contentment. Being morally content with oneself is not a feeling of pleasure – which
would reintroduce the threat of eudaimonism – but increasing detachment from the urges of
sensibility and a sense of being fully in charge of one’s life (Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 117–
118). This goes hand in hand with a growing recognition that the commands of duty are in-
deed one’s very own demands, and that what one is doing is genuinely worthwhile. Moral-
ity is the human ‘ground project’. Secondly, Kant thinks that beneficence in particular will,
36. It is worth noting that, in the Groundwork, Kant rejects (Wolffian) perfectionism as vacuous, not
because he considers it too demanding. In fact, he concedes that if he had to choose “between the
concept of a moral sense and that of perfection” he would “settle for the latter”, since at least it makes
morality a matter of pure reason (4: 443.20–24). The argument for immortality in the second Critique
would get nowhere without the assumption of a duty to be morally perfect. 
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with time, foster a positive sense of love for those we benefit (Metaphysics of Morals,
6: 402.14–16). We will rejoice with them when their condition improves, as a result of our
good deeds. In short, a life that is increasingly responsive to the demands of virtue is likely
to be fulfilled and flourishing rather than dreary, even if that were the impression a novice
might get. And like anything we do well it might be rewarding in the end.37 
The lesson to be learnt from this is that simple statements like ‘beneficence is too de-
manding’ need to be relativised to the agent. What is far too demanding for one person may
be easy and fulfilling for another. Crucially for Kant, it lies within our power to improve. We
do not have to be perfect, let alone produce perfect results (which we cannot do). We just
need to do our best (which we can). In this obvious sense Kant’s ethics, however demand-
ing, cannot be said to be too demanding. The old adage that practice makes perfect applies to
Kantian and Aristotelian ethics alike.38
§9. Conclusion: an asymmetry explained
Kant’s description of the morally good person – as someone who, without a great deal of
fuss, responds to moral considerations less virtuous agents decide to ignore – not only
matches our everyday moral judgements, it also explains a striking asymmetry.39 Some hu-
man beings do extraordinary things at great cost to themselves, particularly in times of
crisis. Moral philosophers often succumb to the temptation to call such acts heroic, saintly or
supererogatory – paradigms of morally good actions that cannot be required. Kant breaks
ranks. As we have already seen, the passive construction is not very helpful here because
agents can make themselves do what others have no right to ask of them. 
In fact, they are unlikely to see their exceptional deeds as supererogatory or heroic.40
A soldier who saves the life of another at great risk to his own will say that he had to help
his comrade, that he was just doing his duty or that the other soldier would have done the
same thing for him. In other words, what seems optional from the outside perspective of the
theorist may well present itself as obligatory from the perspective of the agent; and this is
just what Kant’s theory of moral progress predicts, which involves taking obligations of less-
37. Moreover, a morally good agent can, if Kant is right, hope that sacrifice in this life will be
rewarded in another. Belief in a just and kindly God would undermine the overdemandingness
objection at one stroke. 
38. Overstretching the limits of human nature the only clear standard for what can be considered
overly demanding; and it should be clear by now that Kant can avoid this charge. Beyond that we are
left with vague ‘intuitions’ that likely to be expressions of our own imperfections. 
39. According to Kaehler’s notes on moral philosophy, Kant suggests that we ought to judge
ourselves more harshly than others (Kaehler ms. 126–127).
40. See Colby et al., 1992: 70. Anne Colby and William Damon report that moral exemplars, as they
call them, typically consider perceived risks to be “inevitable companions” of living up to one’s moral
standards.  
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er weight ever more seriously.41 In this clash of conflicting perspectives, Kant would argue
that we should take the side of the practitioner rather than the (non-Kantian) moral theor-
ies.42 If those who do demanding things judge that this is something they have to do, who
are we to distrust their judgement? In the final consequence, the so-called overdemanding-
ness objection says much more about the moral condition of the speaker when levelled
against Kant’s ethics than about the theory criticised.43 
41. According to Vigilantius (27: 558.17–24), the importance of the resulting obligation (and our
assessment in the case of failure to respond to it, in terms of our distance from moral perfection)
depends on the strength that ‘grounds of obligation’ possess in cases of conflict. Acting contrary to
weightier or less weighty reasons one is at fault to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the
motivating ground (or reason) that is thereby left unfulfilled. 
42. In R 7038, Kant seems to suggest that our active obligations to others are meritorious with regard
to them and at the same time owed – though non-enforceable – duties (schuldige, obzwar nicht
zwangspflichten) to oneself. 
43. I am indebted to audiences at Brandeis University, the University of Sussex, the University of
St Andrews, Keele University, Radboud University Nĳmegen, the University of Münster, Leiden
University, Harvard University and the University of Bayreuth. I am particularly indebted to Allen
Wood, Onora O’Neill, Marcia Baron, Melissa Seymour Fahmy, Sorin Baiasu, Alix Cohen, Thomas
Mertens, Bettina Schöne-Seifert, Michael Quante, Ludwig Siep, Marcel van Ackeren, Martin Sticker,
Brian McElwee, Eric Boot, Amelie Rorty, Andreas Teuber, Pauline Kleingeld, Theron Pummer, John
Skorupski and my wife, Kate Moran, for comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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